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FRANCIS A. ALLEN-ARCHITECT OF MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SCHOLARSHIP
Francis A. Allen, who spent the last eight years of his distinguished
teaching career at the University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of
Law, died at the age of eighty-seven. He was a leading figure in law
teaching, and the legal profession generally, for more than four decades.
After graduating from Northwestern University School of Law (where
he served as editor-in-chief of the law review), and clerking for Chief
Justice Fred Vinson,' Frank Allen became a tenured professor at five major
law schools: Northwestern (1948-53); Harvard (1953-56); the University
of Chicago (1956-62 and 1963-66); the University of Michigan (1962-63
and 1966-86); and the University of Florida (1986-94). I once asked him
why he left his tenured position at the Harvard Law School in 1956. He
told me that at the time too many of his colleagues had great difficulty
understanding why, given a choice in the matter, any first-rate person
would want to teach criminal law.2 In no small measure because of the
work and dedication of Frank Allen and other criminal law professors of
his day, that attitude no longer prevails-at Harvard or anywhere else.
Some evidence of Allen's renown as a scholar and his prowess as a
speaker is the remarkable fact that, starting in the late 1950s and
continuing into the 90s, he delivered the premier endowed lectures at
fourteen law schools. They include the University of Georgia (Sibley
Lecturer), Harvard (Holmes Lectures), the University of Illinois (Baum
Lectures), the University of Michigan (Cooley Lectures), Northwestern
(Rosenthal Lectures), College of William and Mary (the Wyte Lecture),
and Yale (Storrs Lectures). 3
Further evidence of the high regard in which Allen was held is that he
was President of both the Association of American Law Schools and the
National Order of the Coif. He was also dean of the University of
Michigan Law School from 1965-71, a time of extraordinary student
unrest-and a time when Allen needed all of his abundant supply of
civility, patience, wisdom, and sense of fairness.

1. At the age of eighty-five, Allen and his son co-authored a biography of Vinson. See
FRANCIS A. ALLEN & NEIL WALSH ALLEN, A SKETCH OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VINSON (2005).
2. Cf Francis A. Allen, CentralProblemsof American CriminalJustice, 75 MICH. L. REV.
813, 816 (1977) (recalling the days when "the basic criminal law course was routinely assigned to
the youngest and most vulnerable member of the faculty or to that colleague suspected ofmild brain
damage and hence incompetent to deal with courses that really matter").
3. Allen gave the lectures at Harvard, Michigan, and Northwestern when he was no longer
teaching at those schools. A number of his lectures were revised, expanded, and published as books
or monographs.
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Frank Allen's experience as a dean during adventurous times was
undoubtedly one of the reasons he cared deeply about liberal and
professional education.4 According to him, "the greatest challenge facing
American law schools" is "[t]he preservation and extension of an
intellectually based and humanistically motivated legal education."5 He
feared "a narrowing of minds and concems"--a "lower[ing] [of]
aspirations for intellectual quality and service to the larger society."6
Allen himself was a product of the kind of "intellectually based and
humanistically motivated legal education" he sought to preserve and to
extend. He was that exceptional person who "possess[ed] both culture and
expert knowledge in some special direction" and is thus able to explore the
problems within his area of expertise with both intensity and in breadth.'
Allen had expert knowledge in a number of "special directions"
(juvenile justice, criminology, criminal corrections, legal education, and
various aspects of substantive criminal law, constitutional law, and family
law).8 In this brief tribute, I shall dwell on only one of his areas of
expertise-the one I know best-constitutional-criminal procedure.
When I started writing about this subject in 1959, I benefitted greatly
from the work of an impressive group of professors who had immediately
preceded me (and who continued to do important work in the years ahead).
I considered the most notable ones to be Allen, Ed Barrett, Caleb Foote,
Bernard Meltzer, Monrad Paulsen, and Frank Remington.
These individuals ignited interest in constitutional-criminal procedure,
contributed mightily to the Warren Court's so-called revolution in this
area, and established the foundation for modem criminal procedure
scholarship. I viewed all of them as "pioneers" in a newly emerging field
(or at least a greatly revitalized one). But I could not help thinking that
Frank Allen led all the rest.
Everywhere I turned, whether it was the right to counsel, search and
seizure, or police interrogation and confessions, Frank Allen had been
there before. He said more things that I wished I had said first than anyone
else. (Of course, it was easy to wish I had said it first after reading what
Allen had said and thinking about it some more.)

4. Many of his thoughts on the subject are collected in FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT
AND EDUCATION (1979).
5. Francis A. Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Education, in LAW,
INTELLECT AND EDUCATION, supra note 4, at 59, 75.

6. Id
7. Cf ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION 13 (Mentor ed. 1949).
8. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE CRIMES OF POLITICS (1974); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
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Frank Allen wrote many important books, monographs, and law review
articles. But perhaps his most important writing-and his most insightful
and powerful writing to boot-is to be found elsewhere. It is the "Allen
Report" (as it has come to be called), the report Frank wrote as chair of a
blue-ribbon committee appointed by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to
study the impact of poverty on the administration of criminal justice.9
All eleven editions of the criminal procedure casebook my co-authors
and I have produced have one feature in common. The chapter on "the
right to counsel"-and "equality and the adversary system"
generally-always starts out with a long extract from the Allen Report.' °
This reflects our view that the report is an extraordinarily thoughtful and
illuminating commentary on the obligations of "equal justice" in the
administration of the criminal law.
The Allen Report and its accompanying draft of proposed legislation
led to the much-needed Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and the Bail Reform
Act of 1966. Moreover, and more importantly, the Report significantly
affected our way of thinking about the obligations of "equal justice" and
the problems faced by criminal defendants of limited means. The Report
underscored that minimizing the influence of poverty in the administration
of criminal justice "involves more than an expression of humanitarian
sentiment or the extension of public charity."" I doubt that anyone has ever
said it better:
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which
this Report is concerned arise in a process initiated by
government for the achievement of basic governmental
purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has as one of its
consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the
persons proceeded against.... When government chooses to
exert its powers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no
less than that of taking reasonable measures to eliminate those
factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the law but
which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations
of the accused's liability or penalty. While government may
not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may
properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on
its administration of justice.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The
9. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963) [hereinafter ALLEN REPORT].
10. See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-79 (11 th ed. 2005).

11. ALLEN REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
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survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and
creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of
authority at all stages of the process. The proper performance
of the defense function is thus as vital to the health of the
system as the performance of the prosecuting and
adjudicatory functions. It follows that insofar as the financial
status ofthe accused impedes vigorous and proper challenges,
it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversary system.
We believe that the system is imperiled by the large numbers
of accused persons unable to employ counsel or to meet even
modest bail requirements and by the large, but indeterminate,
numbers of persons, able to pay some part of the costs of
defense, but unable to finance a full and proper defense. 2
Although portions of the Allen Report were quoted with approval in
Escobedo v. Illinois3 and Mirandav. Arizona, 4 the Report appeared too
late to be mentioned in Gideon v. Wainwright.5 However, the Gideon
Court did cite an earlier work by Allen, one that sharply criticized the preGideon cases governing the appointment of counsel as "distinguished
neither by the
consistency of their results nor by the cogency of their
6
argument."A
Allen's greatest contribution to the criminal procedure law review
literature was probably his work on search and seizure. As fate would have
it, the Court decided the famous case of Wolfv. Colorado7 in Allen's very
first year of law teaching. But he was ready. He went right to work. A year
later, he published a devastating critique of the Wo/f case. 8
Although the Wo/f majority recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure was "basic to a free
12. Id. at 9-10. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee was hardly Allen's only
contribution to the improvement ofjustice. He was Drafting Chair of the Illinois Criminal Code of
1961. He was a member of the Advisory Committee to the National Institute on Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice (1974-78) and a consultant to the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1965-66). He was also a member of the Council
of the American Law Institute (ALl) and an advisor to two of the Institute's most important
projects: the Model Penal Code and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
13. 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.13 (1964).
14. 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 n.41 (1966).
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court,Federalism,andState Systems of CriminalJustice,
8 DEPAUL L. REv. 213,230 (1949), cited in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338 n.2; see also Francis A. Allen,
The Supreme Court andState CriminalJustice,4 WAYNE L. REv. 191, 197 (1958) (attacking the
distinction the pre-Gideon Court had drawn between capital cases and noncapital felony cases as
"lack[ing] integrity").
17. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18. Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1950).
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society" and thus "enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause,"1 9 it declined to require state courts to exclude the evidence the
police obtained in violation of that right. As Justice Frankfurter, author of
the majority opinion, expressed it:
When we find that in fact most of the English-speaking world
does not regard as vital to [the protection against arbitrary
intrusion by the police] the exclusion of evidence thus
obtained, we must hesitate to treat [the remedy of exclusion]
as an essential ingredient of the right.
•.. We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from
basic standards to remand [victims of illegal searches],
together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to
the remedies of private action and such protection as the
internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert
public opinion, may afford.2"
Young Frank Allen was not persuaded:
This deference to local authority ... stands in marked
contrast to the position of the Court in other cases arising
within the last decade involving rights "basic to a free
society." It seems safe to assert that in no other area of civil
liberties litigation is there evidence that the Court has
construed the obligations of federalism to require so high a
degree of judicial self-abnegation .... [I]t is clear that unless
one is content to view the rights of privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment as merely Platonic abstractions, the
reality and content of such rights are determined by the
aggregate of available remedies and enforcement devices
through which the interest of the individual and the
community in the preservation ofthe rights of privacy may be
asserted. The effect, therefore, of leaving to the states virtual
freedom in framing devices for the enforcement of the federal
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
leave to the states the power to give (or withhold) content and
reality to the federal right.2
In commenting, a decade later, on Mapp v. Ohio,22 the case that
overruled Wo/f-and, as it turned out, fired the first shot in the Warren
19.
20.
21.
22.

Wolf, 338 U.S. at27-28.
Id.at29-31.
Allen, supra note 18, at 11-12.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Court's criminal procedure revolution 23-Frank Allen showed no elation.
Indeed, his response to the overruling of Wolf was quite restrained:
That the Court's action will be extravagantly praised and
extravagantly condemned seems entirely predictable. Both
reactions are entitled to be met with some skepticism. The
Mapp holding will force a period of painful adjustment and
accommodation in many states. There is no reason to believe,
however, that the accommodation cannot be made or that, in
making it, state and local law enforcement will be rendered
incapable of performing its essential functions. On the other
hand, one may doubt that the holding makes as substantial a
contribution to the protection of individual rights as the
majority of the Court appears to assume. This is true, in part,
because the exclusionary rule is based on a theory of the
causes of police misconduct that is partial and unsatisfactory.
The fact remains that the administration of criminal justice is
primarily a function of local government. The causes for
abuses of the function must be sought in the pathologies of
local government, and elimination of these ills must be
accomplished primarily at the local level.24
Six years before Mapp overruled Wolf, the California Supreme Court
surprised many. In Peoplev. Cahan,25 it overturned its own precedents and
adopted the search and seizure exclusionary rule as a matter of state law.
In doing so the California court relied heavily on Frank Allen's writings.26
This did not prevent Frank from criticizing the Mapp Court, years later, for
exaggerating the significance of California's "conversion."
He pointed out that "evidence of reluctance on the part of the states to
accept the exclusionary rule ...is still strong" and that the conversion of
California is "balanced" by "the obduracy of New York. 2 7 Moreover,
added Allen, if, as the Mapp Court claimed, California's conversion was
exclusionary rule, 28 "it
part of a distinct trend among the states toward the
'
"29
cuts.
is far from clear which way the argument

23. See generally Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The FirstShot Firedin the Warren Court's
CriminalProcedure "Revolution, " in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIEs 45 (Carol Steiker ed. 2006).
24. Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiemfor Wolf, 1961
SuP. CT. REV. 1,47-48.

25. 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
26. In the course of his opinion, Justice Roger Traynor referred to Allen's 1950 article on the
Wolfcase five times. He also referred to another Allen article, Due Processand State Criminal
Procedures:Another Look, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 16 (1953).
27. Allen, supra note 24, at 28.
28. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
29. Allen, supra note 24, at 28.
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Assuming that general acceptance of the exclusionary rule is
the consummation to be desired, might not the trend have
been permitted to continue?... Indeed, the point can fairly be
made that the clearest achievements of the Court in raising the
standards of state criminal procedures . . . have occurred
precisely in those situations in which the supervision of the
Court has induced such constructive local response.3"
The fair-mindedness and intellectual rigor that Allen demonstrated in
his studies of the Wo/fand Mapp cases are evidenced more generally by his
views on the Warren and Burger Courts-and by his reaction to other
commentators' appraisals of those Courts. Although he had no affection
for the Burger Court, Allen was even less fond of those critics of that Court
whose work had "angry and apocalyptic tones."'"
What our recent experience does again demonstrate is the
danger of relying so heavily as we have in the past upon the
Supreme Court as the instrumentality to achieve efficiency
and decency in the administration of American criminal
justice. Many of those most appalled by... the Burger Court
have shirked the battle in the political and legislative arena.
However difficult the conflict may prove to be, it is there that
a large share of the effort must be expended in the years
immediately ahead. In the meantime .... [o]ne hopes that the
criticism [of the Burger Court] will be both rational and
reasonably temperate, for extravagance of language can
threaten the long-term vitality of the institution. This would
be unfortunate, for we may need the Court again some day.32
Although Allen welcomed the Warren Court's revolution in American
criminal procedure, noting that that Court had sought to reshape American
criminal justice "in the interest of a larger realization of the constitutional
ideal of liberty under the law"33 he did not "canonize" the Court nor
"regard its works as sacrosanct."34 Indeed, he thought it important not to
do so.35 For the Warren Court "frequently failed to articulate its decisions
adequately and sometimes appeared to doubt the importance of adequate

30. Id. at 28-29.
31. Francis A. Allen, Foreword--Quiescenceand Ferment: The 1974 Term in the Supreme
Court, 66 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391, 396 (1975).
32. Id. at 399; see also Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Courtand the Rights ofSuspects
in CriminalCases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 810 (1970).
33. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
CriminalCases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 525.
34. Id. at 539.
35. Id.
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articulation" ;3 6 "was frequently self-righteous and intolerant of competing
considerations";37 and "often, having embarked upon a problem.., did not
go far enough."38
Nevertheless, Allen was confident that whatever its shortcomings and
whatever the retreat from its precedents by future Courts, the influence of
the Warren Court would long endure:
By reason of what the Warren Court said and did, we now
perceive as problems what too often were not seen as
problems before. This is the dynamic of change, and that fact
may well be more significant than many of the solutions
proposed by the Warren Court. The critique of American
criminal justice implicit in the opinions of the Warren era was
essentially ethical. Barring cataclysmic upheavals in
American life even more devastating than those we anticipate,
one expects this ethical insight to persist and to provide
guidance in the years ahead.39
Let us hope Allen turns out to be right. However, it is less clear today
that he will4" than it was when he made those comments, some thirty years
ago.
In the fall of 1993, when Frank had started his last year of teaching at
the University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law, the University
of Chicago awarded him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. Ifone had
to sum up Frank's career in one sentence, it would be hard to top the
University of Chicago's "citation statement":
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
This was true not only in Miranda. The Warren Court failed to realize its
opportunity to place the law of entrapment on a more satisfactory
footing .... [h]aving struggled its way to a new and more useful approach to
[what constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment] ... it
failed to pursue the implications of its insight. Sometimes its conflicting
motivations appeared paradoxical. In the same period that it was pursuing
innovations in the area of pretrial interrogation that many warned were threatening
the effectiveness of law enforcement, it stubbornly defended in the name of law
enforcement the use of undercover agents and resisted efforts to restrict and
regulate their activities.
Id. at 539-40.
39. Id. at 539.
40. See, e.g., David A. Moran, The End of the ExclusionaryRule Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, in CATO SuPREME COURT REVIEW, 2005-2006
(Mark K. Moller ed., 2006) (discussing Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)).
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Preeminent scholar of the criminal law who has profoundly
influenced its theory and practice throughout the common law
world, whose efforts have brought important elements of
principle and fairness to the administration of criminal justice,
and whose scholarship has set the standard for all who work
towards the improvement of our criminal law system.
-Yale

Kamisar

* Distinguished professor of Law, University of San Diego; Clarence Darrow
Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. Professor
Kamisar and Professor Allen were colleagues at the University of Michigan Law School from
1966 until 1986.
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